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Chapter 5
Does the Expectations Trap Render the Natural-rate Model Invalid in the
Disinflationary Zone?
This chapter raises some questions about the epistemological status of the theory
underpinning the original Phillips curve formulation, and the correspondence between the
empirical data and the textbook (theoretical) representations of the Natural-Rate Expectations
Augmented Phillips (N-REAP) curve model. This is no antiquarian investigation, since these
curves have dominated applied macroeconomics for over three decades.
Phillips presented the theory underpinning his dynamic stabilisation exercise, in his Ph.D.
(1953), and in a follow-up article in the Economic Journal (1954). But Richard Lipsey
(1960) presented the first labour-market-based theoretical analysis of the Phillips curve.
Unfortunately, it contained a theoretical inconsistency relating to the deflation region. In the
inflationary zone (wage inflation in Lipsey's model), his curve described the data reasonably
well, and visibly represented the theoretical underpinnings provided. But in the deflationary
zone, Lipsey's theoretical curve became - like his empirical curve - a wage floor (or, more
accurately, a wage change floor), shortly after crossing the horizontal axis. But his
theoretical discussion implied a Phillips curve, in the deflationary region, with a slope of
minus one - which was clearly an inadequate representation of the empirical data. Yet this
internal inconsistency went unnoticed, until Lipsey (1978, 60) reexamined the issue for
Phillips' posthumously published Festschrift. Thus, during its period of policy influence, the
theoretical derivation of the Phillips curve contained a dormant but elementary error.
Phillips pioneered the introduction of adaptive inflationary expectations into this type of
macroeconomics; but as is well known, when the trade-off interpretation of the Phillips curve
unambiguously broke down, it was replaced, or augmented, by a family of short-run curves,
along each of which inflationary expectations were held constant. This intellectual and
policy revolution rapidly colonised the textbooks. Robert Gordon's intermediate
macroeconomic textbook was the first of many to be organised around the N-REAP model.
Under the heading 'Recession as a cure for Inflation', Gordon (1978, 305) explained how
policy-induced recessions can shift the short-run Phillips curve and "reduce inflation by any
desired amount, to zero or even to a negative number". Gordon then presented a diagram
(1978, Fig. 11-1, 307) which has become a standard component of macroeconomics. Policyinduced unemployment creates a divergence between inflationary expectations (held constant
along a short-run Phillips curve) and actual inflation. This shifts the short-run Phillips curve
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downwards, and unemployment returns to its 'natural' rate, at a lower level of inflation. This
is still the standard analysis presented in numerous textbooks.
Milton Friedman devoted substantial portions of his American Economic Association
Presidential speech, his Nobel lecture, and his textbook on Price Theory, to the N-REAP
model. He expressed confidence in the curve as a short-run description of the macroeconomy
during the previous century, where inflationary expectations had been constant, and equal to
zero (1976, 221-2; 1977, 454). But in one crucial respect the diagram which Friedman
presented (1976, Fig. 12.3, 218, reproduced as Fig. 1, below) bears little resemblance to
Phillips' scatter diagram.1 Yet, it is Friedman's Phillips curve (not Phillips' or Lipsey's),
which has dominated textbook representations of the short-run Phillips curve.

\Fig. 1.
Source: Friedman (1976, 218)

1

.

"Phillips translated this analysis into an observable relation by plotting the
level of unemployment on one axis and the rate of change of wages over time
on the other as in Fig. 12.3" (Friedman 1976, 218).
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Fig. 2
Source: Phillips (1958, 285)

Fig. 3
Source: Lipsey (1960, 24)
Compare the slope of Friedman's short-run Phillips curve to the right of the 'natural' rate, with
that of Phillips (Fig. 2) and Lipsey (Fig. 3). Phillips' curve becomes virtually a wage change
floor at 5.5 per cent. unemployment. A 5 per cent. increase in unemployment, from 5.5 per
cent., to 10.5 per cent., produces approximately a 0.5 per cent. reduction in the rate of change
of money wage rates. Phillips (1958, 294) also found that in the six years following the
policy-induced recession associated with the return to the gold standard, unemployment rose
from 12.5 per cent. in 1926, to 22.1 per cent. in 1932, but wage inflation fell by only 0.6 per
cent. per annum. In Lipsey's post-1923 relationship, any increase in unemployment above
approximately 4 per cent. produces no apparent reduction in the rate of increase in money
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wage rates; there is a wage change floor at +1 per cent.2 Since Friedman, like Phillips and
Lipsey, did not see the translation from wages to prices as being troublesome,3 this implies
that any policy-induced unemployment above 4 per cent. cannot reduce inflationary
expectations, because these expectations are not being falsified.
Friedman's diagram (1976, Fig. 12.7, 226, reproduced as Fig. 4, below) became the basis of
the subsequently influential N-REAP model. Yet the shape of the (short-run) Phillips curve
at higher levels of unemployment has shifted from its original slope of nearly zero (in
Phillips' and Lipsey's expositions) to a slope which is clearly negative. The mechanism by
which policy-induced recessions can produce beneficial results is crucially dependent on this
slope being negative. Yet the empirical curves to which Friedman added inflationary
expectations - 'only one wrinkle' (Friedman, 1968, 8) - contained evidence over a long period
of data of an expectations trap4 which would thwart the policy.

2

.

One of the purposes of Phillips' (1958, 283) empirical investigation was to
quantify the observation that "workers are reluctant to offer their service at
less than the prevailing rates when the demand for labour is low and
unemployment is high so that wage rates fall only very slowly". Richard
Lipsey (1981, 558), in his Presidential address to the Canadian Economics
Association, recalled that "neither Phillips nor myself, nor any one else whom
I know of in the early Phillips curve tradition, ever drew an empirical Phillips
curve which did not display the asymmetry that wages could rise fast in the
face of excess demand, and would fall only very slowly in the face of excess
supply. Phillips, for example, calculated the asymptotic rate of decrease in
U.K. money wages as unemployment went to 100 per cent. as 1 per cent. per
annum". A.J. Brown also discovered a wage change floor (1955, 199; see also
Haberler 1961, 7). The dominant pre-Keynesian view at the University of
Chicago was that wages were highly resistant to downward pressure (Davies
1971, 24-29).

3

.

Friedman (1976, 218) states that he is "very ready [to go] from rates of wage
change to rates of price change" .

4

.

I am grateful to James Dean for suggesting this phrase to me. Friedman
(1968, 8-9) believed that Phillips' curve was "reasonably stable and well
defined" for the hundred years that Phillips examined, because inflationary
expectations had been "unshaken and immutable" at a zero value.
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Fig. 4
Source: Friedman (1976, 226)
The expectations trap does not render the N-REAP model invalid in the inflationary zone (i.e.
to the left in the 'natural' rate). Also, if the Phillips curve has a non-zero slope in the
disinflationary zone, then some divergence between actual and expected inflation may be
deemed to exist; thus facilitating the process - at least at the level of textbook theory - by
which the N-REAP model may be said to plausibly represent the workings of an actual
macroeconomy. The issue then reverts to a question of timing - how long would it take for
inflationary expectations, and thereby measured inflation, and measured unemployment to
fall? Friedman (1968, 11) calculated that full adjustment would take "a couple of decades".
But there appears to be no ambiguity with respect to that portion of a Phillips curve that has a
slope of zero. The existence of a wage change floor implies that no matter how high
unemployment reaches, expected inflation (and therefore actual inflation and measured
unemployment) cannot fall. It is here - in the disinflationary region - that the expectations
trap delivers a fatal blow to the N-REAP model.
Thus in 1978, Lipsey exposed a weakness in the inflation-unemployment thinking of the
1960s; but, simultaneously, textbooks began to elevate another misapprehension concerning
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the mechanism by which policy-induced recessions can, with patience, reduce both inflation
and unemployment. Measured unemployment (U) was now, by definition, identically equal
to the 'natural' rate of unemployment (UN), plus any 'unnatural' increment (UUN). This
unnatural component of unemployment was, and is, perceived to be a function of a 'delusion'
variable - the discrepancy between actual inflation (ÎP)and expected inflation (ÎPe).
Unemployment would return to its 'natural' level as soon as this delusion was overcome, and
wage contracts ceased to be based on unrealistic calculations of future inflation.
Formally, in the N-REAP model,
U = UN + UUN, and (1)
UUN = f [" ()Pe - )P)] , where
(2)
" = the speed of adjustment of incorrect inflationary expectations.
But as measured unemployment increases along a horizontal short-run Phillips curve,
ÎP=ÎPe, thereby frustrating the equilibrating mechanism of the N-REAP model in the
disinflationary zone. The existence of an expectations trap, therefore, tends to indicate that
the short-run Phillips curve does not offer a privileged description of an economy undergoing
the process of a policy-induced recession.
The worst inflationary decade in world history began with what, in retrospect, we know to be
an unwarranted confidence in the trade-off interpretation of the Phillips curve. This
confidence might have been injured, if not punctured, had Lipsey - or someone else - noticed
the inconsistency in the underlying theory that had been provided for it. The painful and
uncertain episode of disinflation was accompanied by excessive confidence based, in part, on
textbook representations of the N-REAP model. Yet, as Friedman (1953, 42) pointed out, in
his famous methodological essay, the short-run dynamics of disinflation were the "weakest
and least satisfactory part of current economic theory".5 His polemical genius helped to
create both an environment and a political constituency in which disinflation could be
undertaken. But if disinflation remains a twilight zone for economic theory, and also for
econometric forecasting - then this, of course, remains one of the strongest motives for
preventing the re-ignition of inflation.

5

.

"The weakest and least satisfactory part of current economic theory seems to
me to be in the field of monetary dynamics, which is concerned with the
process of adaptation of the economy as a whole to changes in conditions and
so with short-period fluctuations in aggregate activity" (Friedman 1953, 42).
At the start of the monetarist decade, he wrote "I believe we have a reasonably
good dynamic theory [... we now have a more secure grasp on the quantitative
magnitudes involved] - what we lack for policy purposes is not the theory but
the political capacity to use the theory effectively" (1975, 176, 178).
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